Since World War II, the average midterm loss in the House for the Republican Party when the GOP occupies the White House is twenty-one seats; while it is twenty-nine seats for the Democrats. In the Senate, the average midterm loss is 12 3.2 seats for Republicans and 5.0 seats for Democrats. 13 While the Democrats often experience large midterm setbacks, the magnitude of Obama's midterm losses is so large that it begs for explanation. This Article analyzes how Obama's policies influenced the electoral fate of his party brethren in Congress and explores whether Obama could have taken steps to curtail the Democratic Party's midterm losses without compromising his agenda.
Specifically, this Article evaluates President Obama as a party leader. As a successful party leader, a President helps grow his political party in Congress during good times and helps attenuate losses in bad times. He does so through both political activity and policymaking.
"Political activity" is defined here to include a variety of activities: fundraising for the party and particular candidates, delivering speeches that energize the base (nationally or locally), and making personal appearances on behalf of candidates or groups in states and districts throughout the country. Presidential policymaking is often seen as advancing national interests, but it can also help boost the electoral fortunes of the President's party.
"Policymaking," defined as executive actions and legislative proposals, influences partisan outcomes at the polls through a variety of mechanisms. Since the President is the leader of his party, his job-approval rating and general popularity tend to elevate the attractiveness of all candidates on the ballot affiliated with his party. A President's policymaking may boost his popularity if his initiatives are broadly popular. Thus, we have seen some presidents give priority to popular initiatives.
Even if the President's initiatives are 14 controversial, divisive, or even unpopular, effective policymaking on such issues helps fashion an image that the President is an engaged and influential politician. Voters (especially independent voters) respect effective presidents, even if they do not agree with all of their policies. On the other hand, ineffective presidents are likely to become unpopular. If the President's policy priorities are blocked in the Congress (due to their unpopularity, partisan gridlock, or opposition from powerful interests), the President's job-approval rating will suffer, and indeed there may be collateral damage to the standing of his party. Overrated is the notion that well-timed presidential policies can help the President's party at a midterm election by creating favorable outcomes for voters. It is not easy for the President and his policy team to schedule favorable policy outcomes-particularly economic ones-with the precision necessary to influence the outcome of a midterm election. It is particularly difficult to target favorable policy outcomes in the one-third of states with a Senate race or to the ninety or so competitive congressional districts that could plausibly flip one way or another. Thus, we assume it is rarely feasible for the President to enact and implement policies with such temporal precision that electoral outcomes will be reliably impacted.
I. HOW THE PRESIDENT'S POLICIES BECOME ELECTORALLY SENSITIVE
The opposing party in Congress recognizes that a policy victory for the President is also a plus for the President's political party, and a loss for the President is a plus for the opposing party. As a result, presidential policy priorities create a dynamic of "strategic opposition," where opposition to a policy initiative intensifies when the President designates the initiative a White House priority. In fact, the opposing party in Congress may oppose a presidential initiative not because they oppose the policy on the merits but because the President proposed it and may gain politically from its passage.
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When a President asks members of his party in Congress to vote for controversial or unpopular initiatives, he cross-pressures his partisan allies in ways that create electoral risks for the party. Cross-pressured members may have some cover if the White House succeeds in attracting bipartisan support for a controversial proposal. But, the leaders of the opposing party in Congress will call for unity in opposition to the President's initiative, reducing the opportunities for bipartisan support of a White House initiative. 16 There is now a significant body of evidence that roll-call votes by members of Congress influence congressional election outcomes. Before analyzing how Obama's policy agenda may have contributed to the midterm defeats, this Article examines why some electoral losses for Democrats in 2010 and 2014 were unrelated to policy and therefore should be seen as inevitable. That requires a look at the structure and dynamics of the two elections.
II. IMBALANCE IN NUMBER OF SEATS AT RISK
It is not fair to blame President Obama entirely for the Democratic Party's large 2010 electoral losses because there were some uncontrollable structural factors working against the Democrats. The biggest single factor was the imbalance in the number of seats at risk (sometimes called the party's "exposure"), especially the large number of Democratic House members representing districts that were friendly to a Republican challenger. In the 18 House, the Democrats were defending 257 seats compared to 178 for the Republicans. The situation was far more balanced in the Senate, where the 19 Democrats were defending only one more seat (nineteen) than the Republicans (eighteen).
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Given the structure of the 2010 election and the partisan imbalance in exposure to its potential losses, it was likely that the Democratic Party would experience significant losses in the House. The structure of the Senate contests was balanced in number, but the Democrats were defending seats in more states that are historically competitive between the two parties. Thus, the prospects of 21 picking up Senate seats were better for the Republican Party than for the Democratic Party. The emergence and growth of the Tea Party was largely out of Obama's control, as in our view it was a reaction to aspects of his political identity (e.g., race and progressive orientation) that he could not adjust. Nonetheless, the content of Obama's policy agenda in 2009-2010 made the Tea Party's task easier than it would have been. This thesis is explored more fully below.
III. THE RISE OF

IV. THE ECONOMY AND THE 2010 MIDTERM ELECTION
It is not easy for a challenger to defeat an incumbent member of Congress. Over the past thirty years, the reelection rates for House incumbents have been between ninety-five and ninety-nine percent; for Senate incumbents they have been between eighty and ninety-five percent. When incumbents do lose 35 reelection, a poor economy is often a contributing factor. The immense 36 disruption of the economy caused by the Great Recession (December 2007-June 2009) was still working its way through labor markets in the fall of 2010. The 9.6% unemployment rate in October 2010 was down slightly from a peak of more than ten percent earlier in 2010, but far above the roughly five-percent rate that economists often consider representative of a healthy economy. Additionally, 37 the millions of jobless Americans who had given up looking for work were not even counted in the official rate of employment. The decline among conservatives was difficult to prevent, given Obama's progressive agenda, but the decline among independents was a big cause for concern. Among independents, it seemed that the entrance of Obama into Washington politics had done little to reduce the partisan bickering, despite his 2008-2009 pledge of a "post-partisan presidency." Cable TV news channels, 51 newspapers, drive-time radio, and other information sources portrayed the same partisan fights that independents disliked during the presidency of George W. Bush. As a result, independents started to become disenchanted with Obama.
52
Obama's job-approval rating among independents remained above fifty percent through most of 2009, declined in 2010, and then fell below fifty percent throughout the fall, until the November election. 
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A President's job-approval rating is not as much in the control of the White House as one might think, as it is linked to economic trends and external events that are difficult for the President to control. Nonetheless, we argue below that Obama, with some modest changes in his policy agenda and implementation strategies, could have retained a stronger image among independent voters prior to his two midterm elections. by Obama could have been a significant boost in their visibility.
VII. THE QUALITY OF THE GOP CANDIDATES FOR CONGRESS
The caliber of the contenders running for a congressional seat is another factor influencing midterm elections. When the economy is poor and the majority party in Congress is led by a President with low job-approval ratings, incumbents from the President's party in Congress are likely to face well-funded and highcaliber challengers. This is what happened in both the House and Senate in 66 2010.
An indicator of whether a challenger for a House seat is high caliber is whether he or she was previously an elective officeholder. Novices in electoral 67 politics tend to be weak challengers to seasoned incumbents. By this measure Voter turnout is especially important because voter turnout is relatively low in nonpresidential elections. Compared to turnout rates between fifty and sixty 72 percent when the presidency is at stake, midterm congressional elections drew consistently fewer than forty percent of eligible voters from 1990 to 2006. 73 Eligible voters in the lowest income categories are least likely to perceive differences between candidates from the two parties, which may help explain why their rates of turnout are disproportionately low. 74 Obama had no control over the quality of the GOP candidates who chose to run for Congress in 2010 and 2014. The best Obama could have done was to take steps to protect his job-approval rating, especially among independent voters, since high job-approval ratings for the President may discourage good candidates of the opposing party from challenging incumbents from the President's party. The first study of this question was released on the (and thus the bills not passed), the Democrats would have lost only half as many seats (thirty-two instead of sixty-four) as they did.
VIII. EXPECTATIONS AND DISAPPOINTMENT
Internet soon after Election Day in 2010. The investigator, Eric McGhee, coded each Democratic 120 incumbent in terms of how many "controversial" votes he had made in favor of four Obama proposals: Affordable Care Act, Recovery Act, cap and trade, and TARP. Only 3 House Democrats voted against all four measures; 18 voted for 121 only one of them; 21 voted for two of them; 64 voted for three of four; and 128 voted for all four of them.
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A questionable assumption of this analysis is that each of the four roll-call votes is equally controversial.
Moreover enlarged the sample to include some districts without a GOP tilt, the negative effect of a vote for the Affordable Care Act persisted, but the effects of the other controversial votes were not significant.
134
A limitation of this analysis is that it removes from the data numerous districts that are competitive but not tilting Republican. And the small number of districts in the analysis leads to some imprecision in the reported estimates. Like the first study, it also does not control for whether an incumbent is a freshman or sophomore and thus more vulnerable to defeat.
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A third study, by David W. Brady, Morris P. Fiorina, and Arjun S. Wilkins, compensates for the limitations in the previous studies by (1) including a relatively large sample of districts with a Democratic incumbent in 2010 who faced opposition (N = 231), (2) controlling for whether the incumbent was in the first or second term, and (3) When both proposals are included in the same model, the estimated effects are highly imprecise because of the high degree of correlation between votes for the Affordable Care Act and cap and trade. Seventy-eight percent of the incumbent Democrats voted "yes" on both measures and eight percent voted "no" on both measures. Five percent voted "yes" on cap and trade and "no" on 141 health care, and nine percent voted "no" on cap and trade and "yes" on health care. The study's authors argue that too few Democrats voted against TARP 142 and the Recovery Act to permit their inclusion in the analysis. 143 Considering just those two votes, health care and cap and trade, Brady and his colleagues performed a simulation to determine whether the Democratic Party could have retained its majority under a scenario in which more Democrats voted against the two measures. By uniformly voting down the Affordable Care Act and elevating the number of votes against cap and trade (in those districts where Obama captured less than sixty percent of the 2008 vote), the Democratic Party could have saved forty of the sixty-four seats that it lost.
A variety of 144 alternative analyses by the three authors lend credence to the suggestion that House Democrats, with different roll-call voting patterns, could have retained their majority in the House.
We replicated a similar model of Democratic incumbent performance in the 2010 election using the entire sample of House incumbents (N = 257). One version of the model used the Democratic incumbent's 2010 vote share as the dependent variable and was estimated using a method called ordinary least squares (OLS) regression; a second version used incumbent win/loss as a dichotomous dependent variable and was estimated using logistic regression. We also sought to determine the effect of three roll-call votes: the Affordable Care Act, the cap and trade bill, and the 2009 Recovery Act (the stimulus). The vote for/against each bill was treated as a dichotomous independent variable, and we created an interaction term for each bill with the 2008 Obama vote share.
As district-level control variables, we used Obama's share of the vote in the district in 2008 as well as the Democratic candidate's share of the House vote in the district in 2008. The estimated coefficients on both of these variables, as expected, are positive and statistically significant in each of the analyses that we performed. Being a freshman incumbent had, as expected, a negative and statistically significant effect on electoral results.
For the most part, we replicated the findings of previous studies with respect to the adverse effects of voting for the three bills. When a vote for each bill is analyzed separately, each vote appears to hurt the incumbent's 2008 performance. When each of the three bills is included in the same equation, the Affordable Care Act hurts incumbent performance but the other two bills are not statistically significant. If we ignore the individual bills and focus on incumbents who voted for all three of them, the effect on incumbent performance in 2008 is negative and 
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A COUNTERFACTUAL OBAMA PRESIDENCY 199 statistically significant in both the OLS and logistic models. Overall, the key insight from all of these analyses is that Obama's legislative agenda does help explain why the Democratic Party's losses in 2010 were much greater than structural factors would have predicted. On the other hand, such analyses need to be interpreted with caution. One cannot take literally the causal notion that if more Democrats had voted against all three bills, the House majority would have been saved. The flaw in that inference is that other factors would not likely have been constant.
For example, if Obama's signature domestic initiatives had been ignored or rejected by a Democratic Congress, his job-approval ratings likely would have fallen to even lower levels than were observed, and those dismal ratings would have put congressional Democrats at even greater risk of defeat in 2010. We would also need to reconsider whether Obama would have been reelected in 2012 if he had accomplished none of his major first-term domestic priorities. Indeed, Obama might have been challenged by a prominent Democrat in the 2012 Democratic primary, like President Jimmy Carter was challenged by Ted Kennedy in 1980. Nonetheless, it does appear that Obama's agenda (ACA and, 145 to a lesser extent, cap and trade and fiscal stimulus) contributed to the defeat of some of his co-partisans in the House of Representatives.
XI. OBAMA AND THE 2014 MIDTERM ELECTION
Soon after President Obama was reelected in November 2012, the focus of the parties shifted to the November 2014 midterm election. Unlike 2010, where the big story was the GOP takeover of the House, the issue in 2014 was the fate of the Senate. We begin the discussion of this issue with the structural aspects of the 2014 election and then explore the complications faced by Obama and why Obama's job approval ranking slumped.
One structural aspect is the role of swing districts. Swing districts in the House can be defined as those where historical voting patterns range from +5 percentage points for the Democratic candidate to +5 percentage points for the Republican candidate. In 1998 there were 164 swing seats, the remainder being solidly Republican (148) or solidly Democratic (123). By 2014 the number of 146 swing seats in the House had dwindled to ninety, the remainder being solidly Republican (186) or solidly Democratic (159). The fewer seats in play partly 147 reflected redistricting changes in 2010 (often engineered by Republican officials) and partly demographic changes and migration that put more districts into safe territory for one party or the other. Economic policy again was an important issue. As the economic recovery accelerated in 2013-2014, one could reasonably expect that President Obama 154 and the Democratic Party would reap some political benefit from the declining rate of unemployment, the rise in consumer confidence, the surge in car and home sales, and the rising stock market. But, it simply did not work out that way, and 155 in fact this period proved to be highly unproductive for the Obama White House and their allies in Congress.
Part of the problem was that gains in the "jobs-to-people" ratio were much more anemic than the substantial declines in the official rate of unemployment, 156 suggesting that the job-producing performance of the economy was damaged. 
Karl Rove, Can the Democrats Retake the
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A COUNTERFACTUAL OBAMA PRESIDENCY 201 Another problem was that the gains in employment and earnings in 2013-2014 were not particularly impressive for key subgroups in Obama's base: women, young people, blacks, and households with incomes less than $30,000 per year.
157
Wages for the new jobs in the Obama economy were also reported to be far less than wages for the jobs that were destroyed by the Great Recession, and thus income growth in 2013-2014 was slight. Overall, while the economy was 158 recovering, it was not generating much enthusiasm for Obama or the Democrats in Congress.
XII. ISSUE DISTRACTIONS IN 2013-2014
As the Obama White House sought to focus on the many positives about the recovery and the President's ambitious second-term agenda, public attention was diverted to a series of distracting issues that complicated the picture. Since most of these issues were not easy to resolve, they created additional uncertainty about Obama's effectiveness and ample raw material for partisan attacks by congressional Republicans.
One of the nagging old issues was the proposed north-south Keystone pipeline, which was intended to transport oil from the Canadian tar sands in Alberta to refineries in the Gulf of Mexico. Since the United States was rapidly 159 consuming less Canadian oil (due to advances in U.S. oil production), the Canadians planned to use the pipeline to exploit lucrative export markets in Europe and Asia. Oil producers in the Bakken region of North Dakota would 160 also use the pipeline.
For refiners in Louisiana and Texas, the Keystone 161 pipeline promised significant new business.
162
Obama was cross-pressured by business interests and the Canadian government on one side and organized environmentalists (who saw development of the tar sands as a source of environmental pollution) on the other side. Another disturbing issue was the inability of the U.S. Veterans Administration (VA) to efficiently process requests for medical and other forms of assistance by the thousands of returning veterans from Iraq and Afghanistan. 168 The public did not blame President Obama personally for the poor quality of the VA's public administration, but distressing stories about the VA's incompetence reinforced cynicism about the federal government and drew media attention away from the improving economy and Obama's second-term agenda.
One of the new issues that the Obama administration confronted was the emergence of the deadly Ebola virus in the United States, the first case being reported in September 2014 and a total of four cases by December 2014. 169 Within a few months of the onset of press coverage, ninety-eight percent of Americans had heard or read about the frightening virus, and there was much debate as to whether the federal government was responding properly to the potential emerging crisis. Some critics argued that the Obama administration 170 should have promptly instituted a travel ban from areas (e.g., regions of Africa) where the viral disease was widespread. Backed by public health experts, the challenges were quite difficult to resolve and thus planted more seeds of doubt about the competence of the Obama administration.
178
Surveys also revealed that the public was increasingly concerned about the "gridlock" in Washington, D.C. Respondents were asked whether they prefer 179 an elected official who compromises in order to gain consensus or sticks to his or her positions.
A other legislative initiatives, a decision that was clearly opportunistic, as he had given little priority to gun control during his first term and chose not to elevate the issue as a priority in his 2012 reelection campaign.
189
Capitalizing on the public outcry, Obama requested that Congress enact universal background checks, limits on high-capacity ammunition, an assaultweapons ban, and more severe penalties for people who buy guns and then sell them illegally on the black market. A bipartisan proposal to expand background Obama's gun-control initiative died in the Senate when none of his requested reforms could reach the required sixty-vote threshold. His proposal was never 196 taken up in the House, where passage would have been even more difficult, so he was forced to resort to a few "small ball" executive actions (e.g., sharing of information on firearm violence among federal agencies). Thus, Obama's first 197 legislative initiative in his second term was a stark failure, an outcome that "was predictable based on the issue's history and the ideological polarization on Capitol Hill."
Making things worse, the setback bolstered a second-term 198 narrative that questioned Obama's effectiveness as a domestic policymaker.
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Moreover, the failure of gun control frustrated Obama's base and energized his partisan opponents. Some critics argue that the entire effort squandered political capital that Obama should have invested on immigration reform, the legislative priority that he had some electoral mandate to pursue, since it was highlighted in his 2012 campaign against Romney. The sharp decline in Obama's ratings in 2013 is partly attributable to lingering economic insecurities (even though the economic recovery was continuing), but the botched rollout of the ACA was also a significant contributor. Obama had also set expectations for legislative progress on an 221 agenda that did not move (i.e., gun control, immigration reform, and a grand fiscal deal). President Obama's standing slid further in 2014, prior to the November 2014 general election. His overall job-approval rating was recorded at forty-one 222 percent in both April and June 2014, but the more ominous sign was the asymmetric distribution of intense feelings: Of those who disapproved of Obama's performance, forty percent did so "strongly;" among those who approved, only twenty-three percent did so "strongly." The year 2014 was a 223 particularly bad one for Obama in foreign policy, where his job-approval rating slipped to thirty-seven percent that June. Much was written about his inability 224 to control unsettling events around the world.
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The growing disapproval of Obama in 2013-2014 was not rooted in public Many Americans were nuanced in their assessment of Obama. He was considered "compassionate" (fifty-eight percent) and "a good communicator" (sixty-eight percent).
The public was evenly divided on whether his 228 administration was "competent," but fifty-four percent no longer felt that Obama Party, especially as they related to illegal immigration and the high rate of federal spending.
242
The National Republican Senatorial Committee collaborated with the U.S. Chamber of Commerce to identify, recruit, and support the most promising possible candidates for Senate races. In the Republican primaries, potential Senate candidates from the more conservative wing of the GOP were bypassed or defeated in Georgia, Iowa, Kentucky, North Carolina, Oklahoma, and 
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Oregon. 243 The Tea Party and allied groups (e.g., FreedomWorks for America, Senate Conservatives Fund, Tea Party Patriots Citizens Fund, and Club for Growth) made a determined, multimillion-dollar effort to oust Senator Thad Cochran, the incumbent establishment Republican from Mississippi. The U.S. Chamber of 244 Commerce countered with $1.2 million on behalf of Cochran. Cochran also 245 made effective overtures to the African American community in advance of the state's open primary. The successful defense of Cochran was a big victory for 246 the national GOP, and he went on to win reelection without difficulty. 247 While the GOP was recruiting effective candidates, the independent super PACs, led by Americans for Prosperity, invested more than $20 million in 248 negative advertisements to expose the voting records of vulnerable Senate Democrats. The focus of the advertisements was the Affordable Care Act, and 249 the key targets were Kay Hagan, Mark Pryor, Mary Landrieu, and Mark Begich. The 2010 defeat of conservative Democratic senator Blanche Lincoln 250 was certainly related, in no small measure, to her vote for the Affordable Care Act. To the dismay of the 2014 incumbents, most of the attack advertisements 251 were left unanswered for months, as the big sources of funding for Democratic candidates were held back until closer to the November election. Republicans increased that majority to 247-188, the party's largest majority in almost a century. In the Senate, the Democratic Party held a 55-45 majority. 295 296 The Republicans, however, gained nine seats, seizing a 54-46 majority.
297
The Louisiana race for Senate was not resolved in November due to multiple candidates being on the ballot. Louisiana held a special runoff election in 298 December to resolve the competition between the two largest vote-getters: Senator Landrieu (seeking a fourth term) and Republican congressman Bill Cassidy. Incumbent senator Mary Landrieu, while running first in the field, was 299 unable to muster fifty percent of the vote. 300 Prior to the November election, Senate majority leader Harry Reid blocked a roll-call vote on the Keystone pipeline, even though such a vote might have 301 allowed Landrieu to create some distance between her image and that of President Obama. W hite voters in Louisiana were expected to dominate the midterm contest.
Of the Louisiana white voters, seventy-three percent "strongly 302 disapproved" of Obama. Recognizing that Landrieu was on the ropes, Reid 303 allowed a Keystone vote to be scheduled on the Senate floor before the runoff election in Louisiana. 304 The House easily passed a measure, authored by Republican congressman Bill Cassidy, approving the Keystone project. In the Senate, however, Landrieu 305 worked hard to find the sixty votes necessary to overcome a filibuster threat. 306 Landrieu came up one vote short in finding the necessary votes to overcome a filibuster threat and her constituents voted in the runoff knowing that she was unable to deliver the Keystone pipeline.
She lost the runoff by twelve 307 percentage points, handing the GOP their ninth pick-up in the Senate. 308 Shortly after taking control of the Senate in January, the GOP made the Keystone pipeline their first item of business, despite a veto threat from President Obama. After open debate on forty-one amendments, the Senate voted 62-36 309 to approve the Keystone pipeline. While this vote was a strong majority, it was 310 
2016]
A COUNTERFACTUAL OBAMA PRESIDENCY 221 exchange and the Medicaid expansion. On the implementation side, Obama should have been more attentive in making sure he had the proper expertise in place at the Department of Health and Human Services to implement the insurance exchanges and avoid the web site fiasco that hurt Senate Democrats in 2014.
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Second, the Obama White House should have pursued climate policy with executive actions, since the U.S. Supreme Court had already ruled that the EPA had the power to address climate change under the Clean Air Act. The 333 legislative "cap and trade" proposal added unnecessary controversy to Obama's first term, and forced numerous House Democrats to take a bad vote. Since it was fairly clear from the outset that "cap and trade" would be difficult to pass in the Senate (indeed a Senate vote was never taken on Obama's proposal), the White House should never have asked for a vote in the House. Finally, the President should have included in his 2009-2010 legislative agenda some initiatives that would have been appealing to centrist House Democrats who need to collaborate with some Republicans in order to buttress their credibility among constituents and donors. Promising examples of centrist initiatives that Obama did support later in his presidency are regulatory reform and corporate tax reform. Those long-run, pro-growth initiatives could have been championed by centrists in the Congress as complementary to Obama's near-term economic-recovery efforts.
In sum, Obama was an effective President on his domestic agenda but could have been even more effective over his eight-year reign if he had not contributed to such large Democratic defeats in his two midterm elections. For sure, we have shown that some of those losses were inevitable, since they occurred due to factors that were outside of White House control. But, we have also shown the White House handling of health care, climate change, and other issues 334 335 contributed to the midterm massacres, and the electoral losses associated with those issues could have been mitigated. 
